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1 Introduction
Since 27 November 2008, Part 6 of the Counter Terrorism Act 2008 (the `CTA')
has conferred new powers upon UK Courts (`domestic Courts').1 In particular,
subject only to the need to have its decisions properly reviewed,2 a domestic
Court determining financial restrictions proceedings or an appeal thereof,3 may
in certain circumstances now require all or part of the relevant proceedings to
take place in the absence of any party4with the exception of TreasuryCounsel.5 In
addition, such Courts may also prevent the reasons for judicial decisions arising
from such proceedings from being publicly disclosed.6
In short, Part 6 CTA defines the circumstances in which domestic Courts
hearing qualifying cases may adopt a Closed Material Procedure (a `CMP').7
Whilst such proceedings were previously open for restricted parties to attend,
hear the case against them, bring counter-submissions and ultimately be judged
in public, the introduction of the CMP means that this situation is no longer
automatically the case.8 Should the Court consider it necessary to protect the
public interest,9 the State may now argue all or part of its case entirely in private
*
PhD Candidate, Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge. I am grateful to Emily Charlotte Jameson for
her comments on a previous draft.
1
Counter Terrorism Act 2008 s 100(2).
2
Ibid, s 66(2)(a).
3
Ibid, s 63.
4
Ibid, s 66(4)(b).
5
Ibid, s 66(5).
6
Ibid, s 66(4)(a).
7
See e.g. Al-Rawi v Security Services [2011] UKSC 34 (`Al-Rawi').
8
See however R (Mohamed) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2010] EWCA
65; see also Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.
9
Above n 1 s 66(2)(b).
Copyright © the Author(s).
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution–NonCommercial–NoDerivs 3.0 License.
2 Christopher Sargeant
with the restricted party being represented only by a special advocate,10 and
also obtain judicial decisions based on such evidence in a `closed judgment', a
document which is entirely inaccessible to others.11
On21March 2013, the full scope of this powerwas considered by the Supreme
Court in the case of Bank Mellat (No 1) v HM Treasury (`Bank Mellat').12 In
particular, the Court was asked to determine whether it could itself adopt a CMP
despite the relevant provisions in Part 6 CTA explicitly conferring such a power
on only the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the Court of Session.13 By a
majority of 6 to 3, the Justices held that it could.14 This was not however due
to Part 6 CTA, but instead a result of powers conferred upon the Court by the
Constitutional ReformAct 2005 (the `CRA') permitting it to hear `any' appeal from
a lower Court.15 It went on to hold, albeit now by amajority of 5 to 4, that it would
exercise this power in this case.16 For the first time in its history therefore, the
Supreme Court thereafter conducted a secret judicial hearing. Bank Mellat, its
legal team and the public were all formally excluded from attending.17
Notwithstanding its notoriety,18 the decision of the Court that it could adopt
a CMP is regarded as unsatisfactory. Having identified less than twelve months
previously in Al-Rawi v Security Services that `the right to be confronted by one's
accusers is such a fundamental element of the common law right to a fair trial that
the court cannot abrogate it in the exercise of its inherent power',19 it is difficult
to justify the Supreme Court so easily debasing that same right using powers in
the CRA which likely concern different issues. In any event, it is paradoxical that
such general powers can be used to subvert the effect of specific provisions in Part
6 CTA which explicitly answer the question raised. As Lord Reed has argued, `If
10
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Parliament had intended the same procedures [CMP] to be applied in this court,
it would surely have said so.'20 The minority view, set out by Lords Hope, Kerr
and Reed, is therefore identified as preferable.
Despite disagreeing with the decision itself however, the long-term impact of
Bank Mellat may nonetheless be more positive than first appears. Given that the
Justice and Security Act 2013 has since expressly amended Part 6 CTA to confer
the power to adopt a CMP upon the Supreme Court21 and significantly expanded
its potential use to include all civil hearings,22 the lasting legacy of the decision is
instead more likely to be found in the rules set out by the Court concerning the
future judicial use of CMP.23 This guidance, undoubtedly reflecting wider judicial
disquiet with the procedure as a whole,24 is highly restrictive, both in terms of
how the procedure is to operate in practice and when it should be adopted at
all. Whilst legally therefore, the decision in Bank Mellat widens the categories of
domestic Courts that can adopt a CMP, in practice it will inevitably lead to its
reduced use by such Courts hereafter.
2 Bank Mellat–Background
2.1 Factual Overview
BankMellat was a large commercial bankwith over 1800 branches and 20million
customers. Although it operated primarily in Iran, around 25 per cent of its
business was in the UK.25 In October 2009, following concerns that the Bank
was involved in the financing of nuclear proliferation activities by the Iranian
Government, the UK passed the Financial Restrictions (Iran) Order 2009.26 This
required that from 12 October 2009,27 no relevant person, in particular any
person operating in the financial sector,28 could enter into, or continue to
participate in, any transaction or business relationship with Bank Mellat or its
representatives.29 The effect of the Order was, in essence, to shut down the UK
20
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based operations of the Bank. It also `damaged the Bank's reputation and goodwill
both in this country and abroad'.30
2.2 The case before the lower courts
2.2.1 The High Court
Given its impact upon its business activities, BankMellat immediately challenged
the validity of the Order before the High Court.31 It submitted that the Order
breached rules of natural justice as well as Article 6 and also Article 1 Protocol 1
ECHR.32 During the hearing, the Government argued that `some of the evidence
relied on by the Treasury to justify the 2009 Order was of such sensitivity that
it could not be shown to the Bank or its representatives.'33 Mitting J therefore
adopted a CMP so as to allow such evidence to be adduced. The challenge to the
Order was ultimately dismissed on all grounds. Whilst a closed judgment was
produced, it was indicated that the evidence considered within the CMP had not
been determinative,34 with Mitting J referring to its contents at least twice in his
open judgment.35
2.2.2 The Court of Appeal
The case was subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeal and heard before
Elias, Pitchford and Kay LJJ.36 Although largely conducted in open Court, a short
closed hearing was again held, this time to enable the Court to consider the closed
judgment ofMitting J.37 The appeal was also dismissed on all grounds, albeit with
Elias LJ dissenting in part. In contrast to the High Court however, the Court of
Appeal did not issue a closed judgment. Kay LJ stated that although the Court
had `held a brief closed hearing in the course of the appeal, [it was not] necessary
to refer to it or to the closed judgment of Mitting J.'38
30
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3 Bank Mellat before the Supreme Court–`Two
Steps Backward'
As a result of the failure of Bank Mellat to have the Order invalidated before the
lower domestic Courts, the Bank finally appealed the case to the Supreme Court.
Heard between 21 and 24 March 2013, the first day of argument was devoted
exclusively to considering whether the Supreme Court could and if so, whether
it should, adopt a CMP in order to consider the closed judgment of Mitting J. By
a majority of 6 to 3, the Court determined that it could indeed adopt a CMP.39 It
thereafter went on to hold, albeit now only by a majority of 5 to 4, that it would
in fact do so in this case.40 The appeal against the Order was ultimately allowed.
The Court was however clear that evidence considered during the CMP did not
influence this outcome and it did not itself produce a closed judgment. As Lord
Neuberger explained,
In my opinion there was no point in our seeing the closed judgment.
There was nothing in it which could have affected our reasoning
in relation to the substantive appeal, let alone which could have
influenced the outcome of that appeal.41
3.1 The majority approach—An appeal lies to the Court from
`any' order or judgment of the Court of Appeal
The majority judgment of the Supreme Court in this case was given by Lord
Neuberger, with whom Lady Hale, Lord Clarke, Lord Sumption and Lord
Carnwath all agreed. In their view, the question of whether the Supreme Court
could adopt a CMP could be decided simply on the basis that an `appeal lies to
the Court from any order or judgment of the Court of Appeal in England and
Wales in civil proceedings'.42 Since the Court was also empowered to `determine
any question necessary … for the purposes of doing justice'43 and to ensure that
it was `accessible, fair and efficient',44 it followed that the Supreme Court must be
able to adopt a CMP at least in cases in which it was required to consider closed
39
Lords Hope, Kerr and Reed dissenting.
40
Lords Hope, Kerr, Dyson and Reed dissenting.
41
Above n 12, para 66 (Lord Neuberger).
42
Constitutional Reform Act 2005 s 40(2).
43
Ibid s 40(5).
44
Ibid s 45(3).
6 Christopher Sargeant
judgments from lower Courts in order to adequately consider the information
contained within.45
3.2 The minority approach—If Parliament had intended the
CMP to be adopted by the Supreme Court it would have
said so
By contrast, three Justices, in particular Lords Hope, Kerr, and Reed, dissented.
In their view, since a CMP clearly interfered with the right to a fair trial, explicit
statutory authorisation was required to enable its adoption by the Supreme
Court. Lord Kerr for example affirmed the approach of the Court in the recent
decision in Al-Rawi, which had held that `the right to be confronted by one's
accusers is such a fundamental element of the common law right to a fair trial
that the court cannot abrogate it in the exercise of its inherent power. Only
Parliament can do that'.46 Similarly, Lord Reed affirmed the general presumption
that Parliament does not generally intend to abrogate fundamental rights.47 Since
Part 6 CTA did not contain provision for the Court to adopt a CMP and the
CRAwas passed without contemplation of CMP at all, such authorisation did not
exist. As Lord Reed succinctly remarked, `If Parliament had intended the same
procedures [CMP] to be applied in this court, it would surely have said so.'48
3.3 Analysis
The majority approach in Bank Mellat is clearly built on ideas of pragmatism
rather than of principle.49 As LordNeuberger was quick to note, `[t]he strength of
[the majority approach] is reinforced when one considers the possible outcomes
if the Supreme Court cannot consider a closed judgment (or the closed part of a
judgment) under a closed material procedure.'50 In particular, four possibilities
were considered. Firstly, the appeal could not be heard at all which would directly
conflict with s40(2) CRA. Secondly, the appeal could be heard but entirely in open
Court which would undermine the goal of Part 6 CTA. Thirdly, the appeal could
be heard but in the absence of closed material which would be impossible in cases
45
Above n 12, para 37 (Lord Neuberger).
46
Ibid, paras 102–104 (Lord Kerr).
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48
Ibid, para 134 (Lord Reed).
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in which most or all of a lower Court judgment was closed. Finally, the Court
could be obliged to either automatically dismiss or to automatically allow the
appeal without hearing argument. In the view of Lord Neuberger, each of these
approaches was inherently unsatisfactory.51
Whilst it would at least arguably be odd as a matter of practice to adopt any of
these courses, not least since CMP is clearly available in other domestic Courts,
a number of distinct but inevitably inter-related factors mean that the minority
approach is (at least) legally preferable. Most importantly, by simply providing
that `[a]n appeal lies to the Court from any order or judgment of the Court of
Appeal in England and Wales in civil proceedings', it is difficult to see that s40(2)
CRA contains the power the majority prescribe to it. At best, s40(2) CRA simply
provides that it must be possible to hear an appellate case in the Supreme Court.
It is by contrast silent (at least on face value) as to what form such a hearing should
take.
Since no words expressly authorising the Court to adopt a CMP can be
found in s40(2) CRA, any such power can only be conferred upon it as a result
of judicial implication. As Lord Hutton has previously noted in B v DPP, in
order for such a result to occur, such implication must be necessary and not
merely reasonable.52 This threshold is a very difficult standard to satisfy. As Lord
Hobhouse subsequently explained inMorgan Grenfell,
`A necessary implication is one which necessarily follows from
the express provisions of the statute construed in their context.
It distinguishes between what it would have been sensible or
reasonable for Parliament to have included or what Parliament
would, if it had thought about it, probably have included and what it
is clear that the express language of the statute shows that the statute
must have included. A necessary implication is a matter of express
language and logic not interpretation.'53
Two main reasons explain why no such implication should be understood as
arising in this context. Firstly, the precise question of which Courts can make
`rules of Court' in order to adopt a CMP is specifically and explicitly set out in
51
Ibid, paras 39-42 (Lord Neuberger).
52
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53
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detail in Part 6 CTA. In particular, such a power is explicitly stated to be available
only to the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the Court of Session.54 Since
it is a general canon of statutory interpretation that specific law prevails over
the general, it is difficult to see how the effect of a collection of what even Lord
Neuberger concedes are `detailed procedures'55 in Part 6 CTA concerning the
very issue at hand can be impliedly subverted by a `general'56 provision found
in s40(2) CRA.
Nor can any assistance in this regard be derived from the Supreme Court
Rules.57 It is true, as Lord Neuberger argues, that at the time the CTA was being
drafted its authors would `have known that the Supreme Court Rules had yet to
be promulgated, and could have assumed that they would provide for a closed
material procedure—as indeed they do in Supreme Court Rule 27(2).'58 Despite
this, as he also notes, `if the Supreme Court would not otherwise have the power
to conduct a closed material procedure, it could not, in my view, derive such a
power solely from its rules.'59 As Lord Hope argued therefore, `it was not open to
the President in the exercise of his rule-making function to confer on the court a
power that it did not have.'60
Secondly, even if s40(2) CRA is prima facie capable of conferring the power
suggested by the majority, it is difficult to see that it is capable of providing
sufficient authorisation to override the fundamental right to confront one's own
accusers. To this end, it is important to consider the statutory gymnastics utilised
in the majority approach. In particular, a `general'61 power to hear appeals
from lower Courts in s40(2) CRA which is silent as to the form such appeals
can take and likely did not even consider CMP when drafted must prevail over
`a fundamental element of the common law right to a fair trial'62 and a `basic
principle of justice'.63 It is hard to see therefore how this can satisfy the `basic
principle that fundamental rights can only be overridden by a statutory provision
through express words or by necessary implication'.64
54
Counter Terrorism Act 2008 s73.
55
Bank Mellat UKSC, above n 12, para 58 (Lord Neuberger).
56
Ibid, para 135 (Lord Reed).
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The correctness of this view is further clarified if it is considered that contrary
to the approach adopted by the majority, there are in fact many ways in which
the Supreme Court could hear and consider cases involving sensitive evidence
without utilising CMP and therefore restrict the right to a fair trial in a less
fundamental manner. As Lord Reed notes for example, this includes simply
allowing the Court to `examine the material for itself, without its being canvassed
during the hearing'65 or determining the appeal based only on the publicly
available material as it has done in previous cases of this kind.66 Similarly, it also
ignores that such information can in any event be adduced before any domestic
Court with a significant degree of protection of both its sources and content
utilising Public Interest immunity (`PII') and special measures procedures.67 It
can hardly be necessary therefore to imply such a power into s40(2) CRA.
4 Bank Mellat in the Future–`One Step Forward'
Despite disagreeing with the decision itself, it is nonetheless argued that the
long-term impact of the decision in Bank Mellat may be more positive than
first appears. In particular, given that the Justice and Security Act 2013 has
both amended Part 6 CTA to expressly include the Supreme Court in the list of
domestic Courts uponwhich the power to adopt a CMP has been conferred68 and
expanded its potential use to all civil hearings,69 its lasting legacy is instead more
likely to be the guidelines set out by the Court on the future use of CMP.70 This
guidance, undoubtedly reflecting judicial disquiet over the power as a whole,71 is
highly restrictive, both in terms how a CMP is to be conducted in practice and
when it should be adopted at all. Accordingly, whilst legally the decision in Bank
Mellat widens the categories of domestic Courts that can adopt a CMP, it will
inevitably lead to its reduced use in practice hereafter.
65
Ibid, para 137 (Lord Reed).
66
RB (Algeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] UKHL 10.
67
See e.g. Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.
68
See Justice and Security Act 2013 ss6(11)d.
69
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70
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4.1 Advice for Trial Courts
The first part of the guidance set out by the Supreme Court is aimed at Trial
Courts, most notably their production of closed judgments. In essence, it requires
that Trial Judges give as much information about the closed material as possible
in their open judgment, documents which must clearly identify `every conclusion
in that judgment which has been reached in whole or in part in the light of points
made or evidence referred to in the closed judgment'.72 As Carnwath LJ stated
in AT v Home Secretary for example, `[t]he open judgment must stand on its own
merits. Where reliance is placed on closed material to determine an issue of
significance, that needs to be made clear in the judgment, and the judge needs
to satisfy himself that the subject has had adequate notice of the points against
him.'73
4.2 Advice for Appellate Courts
The second part of the guidance set out by the Supreme Court is aimed at
Appellate Courts. In particular, it is made clear that although a closed hearing
should occur `if it is strictly necessary to fairly determine the appeal',74 Courts
are `under a duty to avoid a CMP if that can be achieved.'75 In this regard, it is
important to note that in the view of the Court `the onus [i]s on the Treasury to
show that this [(i.e. the adoption of a CMP)] was necessary'76 and that this burden
represents `a high standard'77 that will need to be specifically satisfied in each case.
4.3 Advice for parties and their legal representatives
The final part of the guidance set out by the Supreme Court is aimed at the
parties in cases in which CMP's are adopted, their legal representatives and any
special advocate appointed to act on their behalf. In particular, counsel in such
cases are reminded not to push for the adoption of a CMP unnecessarily and
that the opinion of the special advocate will be given `close attention'78 on this
issue. Similarly, the points at issue in any CMP should be narrowed down as far
72
Ibid, para 68 (Lord Neuberger).
73
AT v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 42, para 51 (LJ Carnwath).
74
Bank Mellat UKSC, above n 12, para 70 (Lord Neuberger).
75
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76
Ibid, para 89 (Lord Hope).
77
Ibid, para 90 (Lord Hope).
78
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as possible beforehand in order to reduce the amount of time the Court must
spend in a secret hearing.79 Finally, a basic gist of any evidence adduced (either
in Court or in a closed judgment) should be provided to all restricted parties in
so far as this is possible.80
4.4 Analysis
The guidance set out by the Supreme Court in Bank Mellat is undoubtedly
restrictive and will underpin the reduced adoption of a CMP by domestic Courts
in the future. This will help to ensure that such cases are `exceptional [and not]
…routine'81 and permit a more effective protection of the right to a fair trial in
the vast majority of cases. Where a CMP is in fact adopted, it will also likely
lead to more careful consideration of which evidence is adduced before domestic
Courts in such circumstances and which is placed by Judges in a closed but not
an open judgment. As a consequence of this development, cases involving the
adoption of a CMP will therefore inevitably be more open and transparent, with
more proceedings ultimately heard and judged in front of both all the relevant
parties and the public at large.
In addition, the guidance provided will also likely aid such values indirectly,
most notably by allowing appellate Judges to determine whether or not `con-
vincing reasons … as to why closed material should be looked at'82 exist in the
first place. In Bank Mellat for example, minimal information was provided to
the Supreme Court concerning the contents or relevance of the closed judgment
prior to a CMP actually being adopted. It was therefore virtually impossible for
the Court to determine if such recourse was actually needed in the given case.
As Lord Hope explained, `It seemed reasonable to ask how looking at the closed
judgment would assist … but the court was provided with no answer as to how it
might do so.'83 On any analysis, this situation is unsatisfactory. Its future reduc-
tion must therefore be a positive development.
The true effect of the guidance will of course ultimately turn, at least in
part, based on its interpretation by the Judges and advocates in cases in which
a CMP may potentially be adopted. Whilst to some extent this constitutes an
unknown quantity, the general tone of the guidance suggests wider disquiet
79
Ibid, para 72 (Lord Neuberger).
80
Ibid.
81
Ibid, para 145 (Lord Dyson).
82
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83
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with the procedure, as does wider comment on this issue by both Judges and
advocates.84 Taken together, this suggests that a CMP will in fact be adopted
on a more restricted basis hereafter. At a judicial level, a clear example of this can
be seen in the statement issued by the Supreme Court in Bank Mellat once it had
decided that it would adopt a CMP in this specific case. It stated that;
`No judge can face with equanimity the prospect of a hearing, or any
part of a hearing, which is not only in private, but involves one of the
parties not being present or represented at the hearing and not even
knowing what is said either at the hearing or in a judgment in so far
as it discusses what was said or produced by way of evidence at the
closed hearing.'85
A similar approach can also be seen amongst advocates. In response to
the proposed expansion of the CMP by the (then) Justice and Security Bill for
example, a collection of special advocates, the very persons who are pivotal to the
actual use of CMP, forcefully argued that;
`We remain of the view we expressed in our response to the
consultation (and endorsed by the Joint Committee on Human
Rights): that CMPs are inherently unfair and contrary to the
common law tradition; that the Government would have to show
the most compelling reasons to justify their introduction; that no
such reasons have been advanced; and that, in our view, none
exists.'86
5 Conclusion
The majority approach in Bank Mellat (No 1) is undoubtedly understandable given
the general circumstances of the case and the view of Lord Neuberger that no
other way of hearing the case exists. Nonetheless, it is dubious whether the
relevant statutory authorisation necessary is in fact present. The general language
of s40(2) CRA likely concerns a different point to that at issue and in any event,
84
See e.g. Al-Rawi v Security Services [2010] EWCA Civ 482, para 30 (Lord Neuberger).
85
UKSC, `Further Update on Proceedings' (2013) available at http://www.supreme-
court.gov.uk/news/bank-mellat-v-hm-treasury.html.
86
Joint Committee on Human Rights, `Special Advocates Memorandum on the Justice and Security Bill'
(2012), para 3.
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the existence of an alternative specific and detailed statutory regime in Part 6
CTA which answers the precise question considered by the Court must be taken
to provide at least the primary rules concerning the scope of the CMP. For this
reason alone, the minority approach of Lords Hope, Kerr and Reed on this issue
is undoubtedly to be preferred.
Even if s40(2) CRA is prima-facie capable of conferring such a power, the
majority are also undoubtedly too quick to obviate `a fundamental element of the
common law right to a fair trial'87 and a `basic principle of justice'88 on the basis
of a `general'89 power to hear appeals from lower Courts which likely did not
even consider CMP when being drafted on the basis of practical efficiency. This
suggests an overly relaxed attitude within the Supreme Court to the protection of
fundamental civil liberties, not least given the array of less intrusive possibilities
available to hear cases of this kind, a number of which the Court has used
previously. Bank Mellat must therefore be considered unsatisfactory. As Hughes
has noted, the case sadly sets `a deeply troubling precedent for construing a
power to erode constitutional principles of openness in court proceedings from
pragmatic need and statutory omission.'90
Despite this, the long-term impact of the Bank Mellat case will nonetheless
likely be more positive than first appears. In particular, given that the Justice
and Security Act 2013 has both amended Part 6 CTA to expressly include the
Supreme Court in the list of domestic Courts upon which the power to adopt
a CMP has been conferred91 and expanded its potential use to all civil hearings,92
the lasting legacy of the decision is instead more likely to be the guidelines set out
by the Court on CMP's future use.93 This guidance, reflecting judicial disquiet
over the procedure as a whole,94 is highly restrictive, both in terms how a CMP
is to be conducted in practice and when it should be adopted at all. Whilst legally
therefore the decision widens the categories of domestic Courts that can adopt
a CMP, in practice it will inevitably lead to a reduced use of the power by such
Courts hereafter, undoubtedly a positive result for all.
87
Al-Rawi, above n 7, para 35 (Lord Dyson).
88
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89
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90
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91
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92
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93
Bank Mellat UKSC, above n 12, paras 67-74 (Lord Neuberger), see also paras 89-97 (Lord Hope).
94
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